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We have all heard about the so-called paradigm shift brought about by the UN Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The social model of disability and the duty of
reasonable accommodation are some of the “conceptual innovations” reshaping human rights
law. However, we know much less about what that means in practice. One field in which this
question has utmost importance is that of legal capacity of persons with disabilities, particularly
of those with intellectual, psychosocial and sensory impairments. The recent judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in Ivinović v. Croatia, like other cases decided against the
same state, deals with that issue: the legal capacity of persons with disability. The decision is
part of a growing corpus of disability case law and is welcome for a number of reasons – which I
briefly sketch here. Yet, in this post, I suggest looking at this judgment as somewhat of a missed
opportunity.
In my view, this case offered the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to take a more clear position
on two crucial matters concerning the right to legal capacity of persons with disabilities. The first
refers to the difference between mental capacity and legal capacity and its implications for
domestic legislative choices and judicial decisions. The second concerns the distinction between
substitutive decision-making and supportive decision-making systems, and their compatibility
with the ECHR. Clarifying these questions is not only desirable in light of the aforesaid paradigm
shift in disability rights prompted by the UN framework. By addressing these issues, the
European Court could have also provided some guidance to member States as to what kind of
measures and policies are required today for ensuring people with disabilities equal enjoyment
of their human rights. I will start by contextualising the judgment on Ivinović v. Croatia and
then come back to these two questions.
Contextualising the case
Croatia, like many states across the globe, allows the partial or total deprivation of a person’s
legal capacity “on account of mental illness or for other reasons” (art. 159 of the Family Act,
which refers to any person who “is unable to look after his or her own needs, rights and
interests, or presents a risk to the rights and interests of others”). Accordingly, a court can
appoint a “special guardian” who shall look after the ward, his or her interests and rights as well
as manage his or her assets. Figures indicate that around 410 out of 100.000 individuals are
under guardianship in Croatia.[1] Furthermore, resort to plenary guardianship (total
substitution in decision-making) is extraordinary higher (89%) than the use of partial legal
guardianship (in which the “ward” retains some decision-making).[2]
Based on the relevant Croatian legislation and relying exclusively on two psychiatric opinions, a
Municipal Court deprived Ms. Ivinović of part of her legal capacity. The tribunal deemed that
Ms. Ivinović, who suffers since early childhood from cerebral palsy and uses a wheelchair, was
unable to adequately protect her own interests and might jeopardise the rights and interests of
others. The judicial decision stopped her from disposing of her money and other assets and from
making independent decisions concerning her medical treatment. She was 64 when that
decision was taken and so far she had acted rather autonomously in both her daily activities and
her financial affairs.
The European Court rightly found that this constituted a violation of the applicant’s right to
private and family life (art. 8 ECHR). The seven judges said:
Even when the national authorities establish with the required degree of certainty
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that a person has been experiencing difficulties in paying his or her bills, deprivation,
even partial, of legal capacity should be a measure of last resort, applied only where
the national authorities, after carrying out a careful consideration of possible
alternatives, have concluded that no other, less restrictive, measure would serve the
purpose or where other, less restrictive measure, have been unsuccessfully
attempted. However, there is no indication that any such option was contemplated in
the present case (emphasis added).
The Court further concluded: “the national courts in depriving partially the applicant of her
legal capacity, did not follow a procedure which could be said to be in conformity with the
guarantees under Article 8 of the Convention” (emphasis added).
Ivinović v. Croatia is part of interesting and recent jurisprudential developments. This includes,
among other things, the recognition of disability as a ground of discrimination covered by article
14 ECHR (Glor v. Switzerland), the condemnation of the deprivation of liberty (Shtukaturov v.
Russia), the inhuman conditions of institutionalisation (Stanev v. Bulgaria) and the denial of
the right to vote (Alajos Kiss v. Hungary) as a result of placing a person under guardianship.
Moreover, the Court has held that, by virtue of the right to a fair trial, persons affected by this
situation must have effective access to courts to seek restoration of their legal capacity (Kędzior
v. Poland).  Although the landmark case of Stanev v. Bulgaria did not address the application of
legal guardianship under the right to private life, subsequent decisions have done so. Precisely in
cases against Croatia, the Court has pointed out that “a measure such as divesting one of legal
capacity amounts to a serious interference with that person’s private life”. (X and Y v. Croatia,
para. 102). Therefore, “strict scrutiny is called for where measures that have such adverse
effect on a person’s personal autonomy are at stake”. (M.S. v. Croatia, para. 97). The Ivinović
case is thus a valuable contribution within the articulation of procedural rights that play a
significant role in securing the integrity, liberty and private life of persons with disabilities.
Moreover, in Ivinović the Court qualified the deprivation of legal capacity as a last resort
measure, restricting its application to those rare situations where there are no other less
intrusive means. Nevertheless, this judgment, as those that have preceded it, falls short of
safeguarding the right to legal capacity of persons with disability in its entire dimension.
Notably, none of these decisions has gone beyond the procedural aspects of the use of
guardianships to challenge the institution itself.
(Right to) legal capacity and (factual) mental capacity
The right to recognition as a person before the law, that is, the right to legal capacity, is accorded
universally to every human being. The ECHR does not contain such a right as other regional and
international treaties do.[3] However, as seen above, the European Court has interpreted article
8 ECHR as somehow encompassing this right. Legal capacity entails two intertwined elements:
legal standing and legal agency.[4] The former is the capacity to be a holder of rights and duties,
while the latter is the capacity to exercise those rights and to act under the law. It is this agency
dimension of the legal capacity that has been historically denied to discriminated groups.
Although most of these exclusions have -at least in law- been overcome, people with disabilities
still remain largely deprived of this right worldwide. The reason? Their diagnosed “deficiencies”
in making “rational” decisions. Once it is medically determined that a person lacks the ability to
comprehend or assess the implications of her acts, the common conclusion is that she needs
“protection”. The idea of “protection” (instead of rights) makes all the more “adequate” to have
someone else taking decisions on her behalf. The problem with this logic is that it conflates
mental and legal capacity thereby compromising the human rights of the person concerned.
Morally, we understand that the poor health condition of someone whose advanced age makes
her or his recovery more unlikely does not authorise lowering efforts in saving her or his life. We
also agree that despite the biological fact that only women can give birth, children are a social
(and not women’s) responsibility. Why is it then so difficult to internalise that impairments in
mental capacity do not justify encroaching on one’s legal capacity?
In Ivinović the Court fairly suggests that mental and legal capacity cannot be equated. It says:
[…] any decision based on an assessment of a person’s mental health has to be
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supported by relevant medical documents. However, it is the judge and not a
physician who is required to assess all relevant facts concerning the person in
question and his or her personal circumstances. (para. 40)
Yet the Court does not unpack, to their fullest extent, the consequences of distinguishing
between mental and legal capacity. Avoiding the conflation of these concepts is significant
because it means that decision-making skills simply cannot be considered legitimate grounds for
denying legal capacity (fully or partially). The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities has been categorical in this respect:
This approach is flawed for two key reasons: (a) it is discriminatorily applied to
people with disabilities; and (b) it presumes to be able to accurately assess the inner-
workings of the human mind and, when the person does not pass the assessment, it
then denies him or her a core human right — the right to equal recognition before the
law. […] Article 12 [CRPD] does not permit such discriminatory denial of legal
capacity, but, rather, requires that support be provided in the exercise of legal
capacity[5] (emphasis added).
From this perspective, the partial deprivation of Ms. Ivinović’s legal capacity deserved a
substantial review and not just an examination in procedural terms.
Support instead of substitution
A substantial review in this case implied scrutinising the institution of guardianship itself, which
is based on substitutive decision-making. This figure, as applied to Ms. Ivinović, operates under
the presumption that “deficits” in mental capacity should lead to “deficits” in legal capacity,
which are “solved” by substituting the will, autonomy and preferences of the person concerned.
Acknowledging that this suppression of agency violates people with disabilities’ right to equal
recognition before the law, the Committee CRPD has called upon the use of “supportive”
decision-making systems. Support to the exercise of legal capacity can be given through a variety
of mechanisms, and states are free to choose those that better fit their cultural, legal and
political landscapes. What defines supportive arrangements is that it is the individual concerned
the one making decisions even though s/he is assisted to reach and communicate these
decisions. The supporter does not take the place of the assisted person; the supporter only
facilitates the decision-making process. Interestingly, this seems to institutionalise something
that is usually forgotten: that most of us (if not all) need some form of advice and help to take
many decisions.
People with a disability have the right to retain their legal capacity and to have their desires,
interests and will respected. Acting otherwise on the ground of their physical or mental disability
gives rise to discrimination. Replacing substitutive models by supportive systems for the
exercise of legal capacity is one of the ways in which the current standards of international
human rights law seeks to realise the principles of equality and non-discrimination, dignity,
independency, autonomy, social inclusion and participation for people with disabilities.
Could the European Court have engaged, to some extent, in this kind of analysis in the Ivinović
case? I think that the main reason to answer this question with a “no” lies on the framing of the
applicant’s complaint. The applicant focused on the manner in which the proceedings by which
she had been partly deprived of her legal capacity had been conducted and the grounds upon
which domestic courts had made that decision (para. 30 of the judgment). The way in which
complaints are framed influences the way in which the Court deals with them. Therefore, the
procedural character of Ms. Ivinović submissions could perhaps explain the procedural response
of the Court. Fair enough. Notwithstanding that, other relevant factors make me suggest that it
was possible for the Court to say more. The Court could have at least ‘noted’ the human rights
issues generated by a substitutive decision-making institution like guardianship while also
considering supportive mechanisms amongst the other ‘less restrictive measures’ available to the
State.
To start with, Croatia ratified the CRPD in 2007 (even before it entered into force). Although the
Court mentioned this, the convention did not really serve hermeneutical purposes in the case.
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Secondly, the third-party interveners (The PERSON Project and Mental Health Europe) invoked
the CPRD, claimed that deprivation of legal capacity was an unjustified intrusion in the private
life of the applicant, and argued that states should replace substitute decision-making by
supported decision-making in the exercise of legal capacity. Thirdly, Recommendation 1854 of
the Parliamentary Assembly (26 January 2009) which refers to its Resolution 1642 “Access to
rights for people with disabilities and their full and active participation in society” invites
member States to “guarantee that people with disabilities retain and exercise legal capacity on
an equal basis with other members of society by: 7.1. Ensuring that their right to make
decisions is not limited or substituted by others, that measures concerning them are
individually tailored to their needs and that they may be supported in their decision making by
a support person” (emphasis added). The Court, however, only referred to the Committee of
Ministers’ Recommendation No. R (99) 4 on “Principles concerning the legal protection of
incapable adults” (adopted on 23 February 1999) which, despite containing relevant safeguards,
reflects an outdated and paternalistic understanding of the rights of people with disabilities.
In conclusion
What is suggested here, obviously, is not that the Court should have somehow applied the
CRPD. But it is also clear that the Court does not apply the ECHR in a vacuum. It is certainly not
my intention to overlook the fact that most states in the world still have substitutive decision-
making systems. Transition to supportive mechanisms for the exercise of legal capacity takes
time. The change will take place progressively. However, change cannot be put in motion if
states are not aware of what their human rights obligations consist of. And, so far, states do not
seem to really understand what the shift from substitute decision-making to support decision-
making entails.[6] Against this backdrop, isn’t it reasonable to expect that, in cases like the one
discussed here, the European Court could take a position on this matter and a step further in
providing guidance to member states? I have no doubt that the Court will have again, sooner
rather than later, the opportunity to do so. And then, particular account should be taken of the
substantial questions involved in the protection of legal capacity of persons with disabilities. In
this sense, the challenges ahead are numerous. But here, it suffices to highlight two of them. One
is the need to acknowledge the incompatibility of guardianships and other substitutive decision-
making arrangements with the ECHR and the ensuing call for supportive mechanisms. A second
challenge is to recognise that having a certain category of persons declared legally incapacitated
is a blatant (institutionalised) form of discrimination.
[1] Figures available in Mental Disability Advocacy Center, Legal Capacity in Europe, October
2013. http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/legal_capacity_in_europe.pdf
[2] Idem.
[3] See e.g. art. 6 UNDHR; art. 16 ICCPR; art.12 CRPD; art.3 ACHR and art. 5 of the African
Charter.
[4] UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1. Article
12: Equal recognition before the law, adopted on 11 April 2014, para. 14.
[5] Ibid, para. 15.
[6] See, inter alia, Committee CRPD concluding observations on Hungary (CRPD/C/HUN/1);
Austria (CRPD/C/AUT/1); Spain (CRPD/C/ESP/1); Tunisia (CRPD/C/TUN/1); Belgium
((CRPD/C/BEL/1); Mexico (CRPD/C/MEX/1); Australia (CRPD/C/AUS/1). The Committee
welcomes law reforms processes undertaken by states but shows concerns where guardianship is
not derogated and proposed amendments maintain a substitutive decision-making model.
Ivinović v. Croatia: legal capacity and the (missing) call for supportive de... https://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/10/23/ivinovic-v-croatia-legal-capa...
4 de 4 07/04/2020 10:55
